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Unemployment is the current European nightmare. The paper briefly reviews its 
main features and recalls the debate on its causes. While most existing works 
have focussed on individual aspects of the labour market institutions as sources 
of the rise in unemployment, the paper presents a number of reflections on the 
way the various building blocks of (largely national) employment systems 
interact with each other and how different institutional combinations may be 
more or less suitable to the changing economic environment facing industrial 
countries.
The main points are the following:
• different labour market institutions (such as job-protection legislation and 
unemployment compensation or unemployment benefits and invalidity benefits) 
often pursue analogous objectives -  typically workers protection -  and, as such, 
are de facto “institutional substitutes”. However, functional equivalence does 
not imply economic equivalence in terms of employment performance and 
ability to respond to shocks.
• the internal structure of the welfare system may be relevant for employment 
outcomes. An important aspect which may explain why both the US and the 
Nordic models, while not without problems of their own, produce high 
employment, is that both are conducive to development of the social services 
sector.
• super-imposing a largely uniform institutional set-up onto heterogeneous 
situations has negative consequences for employment. The importance of the 
(infra-national) regional component of unemployment in Europe points to a lack 
of “institutional variety” within EU countries.
• while strong trade unions are more likely to feel entrusted with representing 
the national interest, thereby willing to co-ordinate their action and set 
employment-compatible wages, “artificial” (legally-supported) trade unions 
power is bad for employment. The latter is found in a number of EU continental 
countries.

























































































































































































European unemployment is one of the most hotly debated topics in current 
economics.
The present paper does not attempt an assessment of the relevance of the 
numerous factors put forward to explain European unemployment. More modestly, 
in the next sections a number of reflections covering the possible role that the 
various building blocks of “national employment systems” may play in the size 
and persistence of the unemployment problem are presented. All these reflections 
are organised around the theme of institutional choice and economic 
environment1, with particular regard to the employment/unemployment outcomes.
Institutions are collective rules and routines of behaviour developed to cope 
with an uncertain environment. They are changeable, but institutional choice 
differs from rational choice in the sense that it is difficult to ascertain a conscious 
decision (and a well defined decision-maker) behind it. Moreover, once 
established, institutions acquire they own momentum and exhibit unanticipated 
effects. As institutions are a means to cope with an uncertain environment, ‘good’ 
institutions differ from ‘bad’ institutions in their ability to reflect the amount and 
nature of variety in their environment, including changes over time. A mismatch 
between institutions and environment will result in efficiency losses. The 
European unemployment problem can be read, at least in part, in terms of 
mismatching between the institutions, not only those of the labour market, and a 
new economic environment.
Institutions within the same socio-economic system tend to be 
interconnected, often in ways that are not immediately evident. This tendency is 
sometimes referred to under the notion of “embeddedness” or “large system”. 
Freeman (1995), who employed it in discussing the Swedish case, argued that in a 
large welfare state, such as those found in a number of European countries, 
economic agents are more tightly linked through institutions than in a more 
decentralised type of economy. Changes in one part of the system may lead to 
consequences in other parts that are unexpected on the basis of standard economic 
theory, which tends to overlook institutional correspondences within a system.
Embeddedness and the related potential mismatching between institutions 
and the economic environment pose special difficulties for the identification of the 
effect of any given institution on economic outcomes, including unemployment. 
These problems are beyond those deriving from the well known empirical




























































































difficulties of measuring the relevant aspects of the several institutions. Such 
measurement difficulties have been bravely faced by the OECD, whose work 
constitutes the basis for most of the subsequent exercises trying to link institutions 
and unemployment performance2.
The problem is multifaceted. First, the fact that the institutions are 
intertwined makes it difficult to disentangle their individual effects because rarely 
one part comes without the others. Moreover, across systems one can often find 
examples of “functional equivalence” in that comparable functions are performed 
by different institutional mechanisms. Finally, it will be argued that the impact of 
a given institution on equilibrium unemployment may differ on the basis of the 
overall economic scenario3. Further technical difficulties derive from the likely 
non-linearity of their impact. This derives from the combined effect of institutional 
arrangements on the microeconomic behaviour and from the uncertain timing of 
the impact on labour market performance of institutions which change discretely 
but whose change is not an exogenous event.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 provides a bird’s-eye view on the debate on European 
unemployment, with particular reference to the role of labour market functioning, 
which is the most commonly cited factor in explaining European unemployment.
Sections 3 analyses the role of the welfare system. After a brief discussion of 
the interconnections between several transfer programmes, the different typologies 
of welfare system existing in Europe are explored.
Section 4 considers labour market institutions. In particular, we discuss the 
scope similarities between the rules protecting the individual workers in their 
current job position, welfare programmes aiming at protecting them in case of 
unemployment, and the action of unions.
Section 5 analyses the close relationship existing between the rigidities in 
product and labour markets.
Section 6 is dedicated to the issue of regional unemployment, which is
2 For recent examples see Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1996), Scarpetta (1996) and Nickell 
(1997).
3 Put simply, one should explain why the European rigidities were not a problem in the 1950s 
and 60s, when Europe was catching up and the fastest growing industries were the ones 




























































































interpreted in terms of institutional mismatch between nationally homogeneous 
rules and practices and heterogeneous regions, in terms of productivity levels and 
degree of economic development.
The final section summarises the main messages of the analysis and offers 
some policy remarks.
2. The “state of the art” regarding EU unemployment
2.1. A snapshot on the debate
The starting point of the debate is the rise in EU unemployment from cyclical peak 
to peak vis-à-vis a remarkable long run stability in the US (Graph 1). The picture 
for the employment to working age population ratio is similar (Graph 2)4.
The stylised fact of a long run rise in EU unemployment is confirmed when 
one looks at more economically-based definitions of the trends in unemployment, 
for instance the short run trade-off between unemployment and inflation, along the 
lines suggested by Elmeskov (1993) (Graph 3).
4 The employment rate has risen in the US, mostly because of the large inflow of females into the 
labour market, while it has been declining in the EU as a whole (the decline for males more than 
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Graph 3. Change in inflation (CPI) and unemployment, EU15 and USA, 1962-1995.
EU15
Change in inflation (CPI)
USA





























































































The different evolution across the Atlantic seems to hint at structural factors, 
i.e. factors not related to the stance of the macroeconomic policy, which may be 
relevant for some sub-periods and as a factor triggering unemployment, but cannot 
explain the longer run divergence.
A further element which precludes the interpretation of the rise in EU 
unemployment as a simple effect of an inappropriate aggregate demand 
management is in the vast array of differences across countries, in both the level 
and composition of unemployment and employment (Tables 1 and 2). This fact is 
in stark contrast with the increasing homogeneity in the business cycle conditions 
across Europe5. For instance, a frequently overlooked aspect of the comparison 
between the US and Europe is that a number of EU countries have achieved a 
performance that is broadly comparable to that of the US, in terms of both 
unemployment and employment rate.
The supply side has therefore been analysed, looking at the possible shifts in 
the wage and price fixing behaviour. The most popular scheme is that of Layard et 
al. (1991), where a natural rate of unemployment is defined at the intersection of a 
wage setting curve and a price fixing curve in the wage/employment space when 
price and wage expectations are both fulfilled 6 7. Suitable assumptions on the 
technology and/or the underlying labour supply behaviour are added so as to 
guarantee that the long run natural rate does not depend on the productivity trend 
and the capital endowment1.
5 See European Commission (1997b). Needless to say, there are exceptions to these business 
cycle synchronisation trends (as an example consider the current UK cyclical misalignment). 
Moreover, the current cyclical situation helps to explain some of the current discrepancies across 
European countries (again the UK case may provide an example). However, no current cyclical 
factor may explain the differences between, for instance, Germany and Austria or Spain and 
Portugal.
6Other approaches may be rewritten along similar lines, like for instance that of Phelps (1994) or 
the more traditional Phillips curve adjustment mechanism. Even those approaches refuting the 
analytical tool of the decomposition of unemployment into a NAIRU and short-run 
disequilibrium components (see for instance Rogerson, 1997) tend to emphasise the presence of 
similar long run shift factors in explaining the rise in European unemployment.
7In the short run the natural rate may differ from its long run level because of behavioural lags 
capturing the presence of persistence (the simplest formulation is that of having a wage equation 




























































































Table 1. Unemployment rate, 1990s.






Austria 3,7 3,2 1,6 1,4 1,3
Belgium 8,5 5,4 3,0 0,7 1,9
Denmark 8,6 7,0 1,5 1,0 1,3
Finland 14,0 14,3 1,8 1,4 0,8
France 11,1 8,1 2,5 0,9 1,5
Germany 7,3 5,8 1,2 1,7 1,6
Greece 8,3 4,4 4,3 0,6 2,4
Ireland 14,5 12,9 1,8 0,6 1,0
Italy 10,3 6,5 4,4 0,6 1,9
Luxembourg 2,5 1,6 3,9 0,6 2,1
Netherlands 6,4 4,5 2,3 0,6 1,7
Portugal 5,6 4,1 2,8 1,0 1,5
Spain 20,9 13,9 2,5 0,8 1,8
Sweden 7,5 6,5 2,4 1,0 0,8
UK 9,5 9,1 2,0 1,2 0,7
EU15 10,0 7,9 2,1 1,1 1,4
United States 6,6 5,3 2,6 0,8 1,0
Table 2. Employment rate, 1990s.






Austria 67,4 87,0 0,7 0,5 0,8
Belgium 54,6 87,2 0,4 0,4 0,7
Denmark 73,4 86,5 0,8 0,7 0,9
Finland 62,5 78,3 0,5 0,5 1,0
France 57,6 87,3 0,3 0,5 0,8
Germany 63,1 88,2 0,6 0,5 0,7
Greece 53,4 90,0 0,4 0,6 0,5
Ireland 51,7 79,5 0,5 0,7 0,6
Italy 52,6 84,2 0,4 0,5 0,6
Luxembourg 74,7 93,0 0,5 0,4 0,6
Netherlands 62,7 88,5 0,6 0,4 0,7
Portugal 66,2 89,9 0,5 0,7 0,8
Spain 45,9 80,0 0,4 0,6 0,5
Sweden 73,5 85,5 0,5 0,8 1,0
UK 67,5 84,8 0,7 0,7 0,8
EU15 59,4 86,1 0,5 0,6 0,7
United States 71,7 87,3 0,7 0,7 0,8




























































































The debate has been mostly focussed on labour market functioning as the 
source of these shift factors. However, what happens to the product market side 
(the price fixing equation) may be equally relevant. Lack of competition in the 
product markets will result in lower employment as firms set higher prices and 
produce less output, thereby reducing labour demand at any given wage rate. From 
a macroeconomic point of view, besides having an aggregate demand effect, high 
real interest rates and/or credit rationing may increase the cost of expanding output 
and hence shift downward the labour demand schedule8. Lack of competition, 
especially when resulting from regulations and other government policies that 
favour incumbents, may also result in lower productivity levels and slower 
productivity growth, as there is less incentive to reduce X-inefficiencies and to 
innovate. This, in turn, may have a negative effect on employment.
Empirically, the effect of product market barriers in reducing output and 
employment has been studied essentially on a sectoral basis9. Its importance has 
been stressed in particular for the service sector, for which, as shown by Koedijk 
and Kremers (1996), there is clear evidence that the overall degree of product 
market regulation is higher in continental Europe than in the “Anglo-Saxon” 
countries. At a more detailed level, comparative case studies suggest that product 
market restrictions play a particularly important role in reducing output and 
employment of service industries in continental Europe compared to the United 
States (Lewis et al., 1994)10. International comparisons of price and productivity 
in services confirm that the prices of many services in continental Europe relative 
to the USA are above the prevailing exchange rates and the productivity levels 
measured at purchasing power parity are often lower in Europe (Van Ark and 
Monnikhof, 1997), product market regulations being among the reasons for the 
under-performance of services.
8 The role of the interest rate in determining employment outcomes is central in the model 
proposed the Phelps (1994). Even if, for the sake of precision, one should say that in his class of 
models assets considerations also have an impact on workers’ behaviour, a fair description of the 
interest rate-employment chain may be that the position of the labour demand schedule depends 
on the present value of the firm. Empirically, a relevant aspect to be considered in comparing 
Europe to the US is the underdevelopment of European financial markets (with the exception of 
the UK) in comparison to the US: for example, European companies do not have access to well 
capitalised equity markets, the role of venture capital is very limited, ‘securitisation’ of debt 
finance is undeveloped. Such underdevelopment can be particularly penalising for SMEs, as they 
are more confined to their national systems and have specific problems in securing credit.
9 For a recent survey on product market competition and its relationship with employment see 
Geroski et al. (1996).
10 In some cases, notably retailing, high wage minima further contribute to limit employment 
performance compared to the US, an example of complementarity between labour and product 




























































































More difficult to establish is the exact relevance of these different regulation 
patterns at the aggregate level. Moreover, their relevance as an explanation for the 
rise in unemployment is downplayed by the apparent increase in the degree of 
competition over time, particularly in connection with the increasing trade­
openness of industrial economies. Even in the services sector the absolute level of 
regulation is also now declining in continental Europe. However, the gap between 
the two groups of countries has considerably increased over time, reflecting earlier 
and more systematic deregulation in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries compared to 
continental Europe (OECD, 1992), whose positive employment effects might be 
accruing now11. The importance of regulations in the services sector may have 
risen because of the growing weight of this sector in employment performance.
A similar point may be made concerning the “defensive” industrial policies 
bias characterising continental European countries, which in the longer run may 
have contributed to delay the exploitation of the new technologies and lowered 
output and employment growth. It has also been argued that the excess of product 
market regulation in Europe may have prevented the supply of entrepreneurs from 
matching the rise in labour supply (Krueger and Pischke, 1997).
Leaving Section 5 to spell out the relationship of complementarity between 
product and labour market regulations, our brief summary of the debate 
concentrates on the labour market aspects which are the hallmarks of this debate. 
As a starting point, a three-way partition is drawn, based on the nature - direct or 
indirect - of the role of the labour market in counting the rise in unemployment. In 
the case of an indirect role, a distinction is made according to the micro- or 
macroeconomic nature of the “environmental” changes to which the labour market 
would have responded inadequately.
According to a first strand of opinion, the rise in “equilibrium” 
unemployment is directly caused by some labour market changes leading to a 
wage push. The relevant EU-US dichotomy is that between the low-employment- 
high-wage-growth path of the former and the combination of high employment 
and low-wage-growth in the latter (Graphs 4 and 5). However, many structural 
differences in the labour market functioning between EU and US predate the 
upward trend in EU unemployment. Many regulatory changes of the European 
labour markets and in the generosity of their welfare systems may be located in the 
sixties, with lagged effects which might have taken a long time to spread over. 
However, the last fifteen years, although exceptions can be found, can hardly be 
defined as a wage push period for EU countries (Graph 6).
11 Taking into account the substantial lag presumably existing between the implementation of 
product market liberalisation and the response of labour demand (in the case of the UK and New 




























































































G raph 5. G row th  o f raa l p ro du c t w age, EU15 and USA.
(1 980.100)
1980 1982 1984 1968 196* 1970 1972 1974 197* 197* 19*0 19*2 19*4 19*6 191* 1990 1992 1994
Year
G raph 6. A d juste d  w age share, to ta l econom y, in EU15 and USA.





























































































A second strand of opinion emphasises the role of the (mostly already existing) 
rigidities in the European labour market functioning as an impediment to the 
adjustment to a new “micro” scenario, asking for more flexibility and, at least 
temporary, wider wage differentials. The EU-US comparison is established here in 
terms of an earnings (and incomes'2) inequality-unemployment trade-off. The 
factors triggering the change in the overall scenario, and asking for a widening of 
wage differentials, are usually identified in the skill-biased technical progress and, 
to a minor extent, in the effects of globalisation. The problem with this line of 
reasoning is that, while in the US the relative position of the less skilled has 
clearly deteriorated in both wages and employment terms, suggesting the presence 
of a shift in the composition of labour demand12 3, the rough stability in the relative 
position of the unskilled in the EU case has been obtained for both wages and 
employment conditions. In other words, the bulk of the rise in EU unemployment 
cannot be attributed to a disproportionate rise in unemployment of the unskilled, 
even if the latter are the group more prone to unemployment (in US like in Europe; 
Table 3).
12 While the possibility of a trade-off between wages inequality and unemployment is quite 
natural (for instance insofar as a binding minimum wage lets the bottom section of the wages 
distribution disappear, unemployment rises and wages’ inequality shrinks), the presence of a 
trade-off between unemployment and household incomes inequality is less clear-cut, given that 
unemployment is itself a source of inequality (for an assessment of the respective contributions 
of unemployment and earnings inequality to overall incomes inequality, see OECD, 1997a). The 
trade-off may derive from the fact that income transfers to the poorest may finance their non­
employment choices.
13 Shift which may have aggregate implications for unemployment if the wage equation is non­
linear (see for a simple discussion Nickell and Bell (1995) who however dismiss the importance 





























































































Table 3. Unemployment differentials by educational level (1994).




25-29 25-64 25-29 25-64 25-29 25-64
Austria 1,9 1,7 0,2 0,5 1,6 0,6
Belgium 1,7 1.8 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,6
Denmark 2,4 1,7 0,8 0,6 0,9 0,5
Finland 1,9 1,4 1,0 0,7 0,6 0,4
France 1,8 1,4 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,6
Germany 2,1 1,6 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,6
Greece 0,8 0,7 1,2 U 1,3 0,7
Ireland 2,4 2,0 0,7 0,7 0,5 0,4
Italy 1,0 1,1 na na 1,7 0,9
Netherlands 1,9 1,7 na na 1,4 0,9
Portugal 0,9 1,0 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,4
Spain 1,2 1,1 0,9 1,0 u 0,7
Sweden 1,5 1,2 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,4
United Kingdom 2,3 1,6 0,3 0,5 0,4 0,5
EU 1,7 1,4 0,5 0,5 0,9 0,6





























































































In the third view, the role of the European labour market rigidities is also indirect. 
The basic idea here is the presence of (quasi) hysteresis forces. A leading example 
may be that of employment protection legislation (EPL), and in particular of the 
firing restrictions, whose presence in Europe mostly predates the rise in 
unemployment. While their impact on labour demand, for a given wage rate, is 
small and indeterminated, strict EPL may cause lags in the employment response 
even after a negative shock has faded away (on top of a possible feedback on 
wages by supporting insiders’ bargaining power). This, and other mechanisms14, 
may not have led to changes in the long run natural rate, but they may have 
contributed to persistence in unemployment after the particularly severe adverse 
macro-demand shocks, a result which may be empirically difficult to distinguish 
from a change in the natural rate.
These three different views may be somehow ordered according to the 
emphasis put on the labour market factors in explaining unemployment and the 
corresponding differences in the prescription of “painful” reforms in the European 
labour markets15.
Starting from a reversed order, the third view recommends avoiding 
excessively restrictive macro policies so as to prevent the rise in unemployment. 
Now that unemployment has been created, on top of the list of priorities is a more 
expansionary macroeconomic policy mix16. This should be coupled with labour 
market reforms so as to remove the “speed limits” which otherwise would arise in 
the case of an aggregate demand push.
The second view looks at “structural” changes in the economic scenario. The 
debate on unemployment becomes intertwined with that on the ability of the 
economic system to exploit the potential implicit in technical progress17. The
14 For instance the real wage rigidity deriving from unions’ bargaining (to be related to the 
overall structure of unions’ bargaining), the shrinking membership of the insiders’ group and the 
disenfranchisement of the long term unemployed gradually becoming outsiders. Persistence 
effects may also derive from the presence of adjustment costs for capital and the putty-clay 
nature of investments (for a model along these lines see Caballero and Hammour, 1997). The 
generosity of unemployment compensation contributes to explain the persistence of 
unemployment at a high level after the disinflationary shocks of the 1980s in Ball (1996).
15 A different, even if related issue, is that of the political feasibility of such reforms, an issue 
emphasised for instance in Alogoskoufis et al. (1995) and which we will only briefly touch upon 
in the last section.
16 Just to give an example, one may refer to Modigliani (1995).
17 The reference here is to that literature (see Freeman and Soete 1994, and OECD, 1996a) which 
looks at the presence of specific aspects of the present wave of technical progress and/or the 
mismatch with several institutions, which might have led to difficulties in exploiting the full 




























































































presence of an inequality-unemployment trade-off suggests policy interventions 
not limited to dismantling labour market rigidities: human capital formation and 
schemes for sustaining the demand of the unskilled are often advocated so as to 
avoid a widening gap between the demand and supply of skills and improve the 
inequality-unemployment trade-off.
More bluntly, the first view points to the need of an overall reform of the 
European social system and the overhaul of labour market rigidities.
2.2. The role of labour market institutions
Whatever the differences in the role of the labour market in the literature, the 
specific institutions analysed tend to be the same.
Our brief summary of the debate will touch upon the aspects which have 
catalysed most of the attention: the welfare system, the unions’ bargaining 
structure and the employment protection regulation18. Table 4 presents a number 
of indicators summarising the institutional features of labour markets in the EU 
and the US19.
deceleration in the (measured) rate of growth of labour productivity. An ambitious attempt to 
link all these issues is in Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), where the lags and difficulties in 
exploiting a major innovation also explain the rise in wages inequality.
18 For a more detailed survey of the debate, see Sestito (1997).
19 The data come from OECD (1994), for the EPL, from OECD( 1997c), for unions’ bargaining 
characteristics. The data on benefits generosity, which are expressed gross taxes, come from 
OECD (1997c); the data on non-unemployment benefits come from Blondal and Pearson (1995). 
The data on unemployment compensation for Italy and Sweden were adapted by the Authors. For 
Italy we followed Fabiani et al (1997) in considering the effective overall expenditure, including 
the Wage Supplements Funds (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni). For Sweden the OECD measure 
does not appear to take account of the “carousel” effect arising from the possibility of the 
unemployed to regain access to income support via training (see Martin, 1996); arbitrarily we 
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The welfare system has a clear potential in explaining the rise in unemployment. 
The generosity of its transfer programmes may have labour supply disincentives. 
Probably the single most debated item has been that of the unemployment benefits 
(UB), which have been analysed both from a micro and macro perspective. 
Generous benefits may impact on job search (financing a choosier strategy by the 
unemployed20), on insiders’ bargaining power and on wage differentials. 
Therefore, they may play a threefold role: sustain aggregate wage push (because of 
the reduction in effective labour supply or because of their impact on the workers’ 
outside option in wages bargaining); lead to persistence (mostly because of their 
impact on long term unemployment, particularly whereas there are lax limits to 
benefits duration); impede the widening of wage differentials (because their same 
presence provides for a wage-floor even where no minimum wage legislation 
applies).
The empirical evidence on their relevance, however, is mixed21.
At the microeconomic level, where most of the research has considered their 
effects on the probability of leaving the unemployment rolls, the effects of the 
levels of benefits on the length of unemployment spell appear to be relatively 
modest, the duration of benefits being proportionally more important than their 
level. The difficulty of obtaining a quantitative assessment is compounded by the 
presence of several unmeasured aspects of the system, first of all those related to 
its administration: the tighter the administration of benefits, especially concerning 
job-search requirements, the lower the labour supply disincentives22.
The macroeconomic literature is more consistent in its finding of a positive 
correlation between the overall generosity of the UB system and unemployment. 
However, the exact chain linking them to the unemployment performance remains 
somewhat unspecified23.
20 Needless to say that such a strategy may have positive long run effects insofar as it allows 
better job-matching. Moreover, it is well known that a side effect of the UB system is that new 
entrants are induced to accept any job so as to gain the right to claim, in the future, for the UB.
21 See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Meyer (1995) for surveys of the micro literature, 
mostly aiming at measuring the direct impact of the UB on job search behaviour.
22 Moreover, the impact of the benefits seems to vary according to the situation of the labour 
market (see Armlampalan and Stewart, 1995), which by itself would imply a non-linear 
relationship between benefits generosity and equilibrium unemployment.
23 Examples are in Layard et al. (1991) and OECD (1994), whose overall measure of UB 





























































































Irrespective of the specific nature of the transfer programmes, the size of the 
welfare state has been considered relevant because of the tax burden implicit in its 
financing. The idea is that the rise in labour taxes (the tax wedge) may have been 
detrimental to employment via labour demand, contributing to capital-labour 
substitution.
Essential for this line of reasoning is the condition that the tax burden is not 
entirely carried by workers. Until recently, the presence of a low long-run 
elasticity of labour supply at the individual level has been used for arguing that 
taxes may have no impact on equilibrium unemployment. Actually, in a 
competitive labour market, an inelastic supply implies that the burden of taxation 
is carried entirely by workers, with no effect on quantities. However, it has long 
been known that changes in taxes, like other shocks such as the oil price hikes of 
the 1970s, may lead to “real wage resistance”24. Moreover, the elasticity of the 
individual labour supply is not the relevant parameter when labour markets do not 
clear, because of union bargaining or efficiency wage mechanisms. Evidence of a 
significant positive relationship, in (continental) European countries, between the 
long-run rise of labour taxes and that of unemployment has been linked to the 
action of unions25.
Whatever their impact on aggregate unemployment, high tax rates can affect 
the structure of employment, particularly in connection with the development of 
activities in the informal economy. For countries like Italy, the high weight of self- 
employment has been often attributed to the relative easiness of avoiding the tax 
burden implicit in this occupational choice. In the case of the Nordic countries, it 
has been argued (Angell, 1966) that the level reached in the mid ‘80s by the 
marginal tax rates for most of the workers would have implied, even assuming 
very modest elasticities of supply, large quantitative effects, inducing to substitute 
home production and informal sector activities to additional hours of work.
Most of the evidence on the role of taxes on unemployment comes from
24 The classical interpretation of the ‘70s in terms of “real wage resistance” is that by Bruno and 
Sachs (1985). A across countries comparison of the timing of the adjustment of net wages, 
showing that in the European countries the process may be quite slow, is in Tyrvainen (1994). 
According to a comprehensive study (OECD, 1992), on average for sixteen industrial countries a 
1 percent rise in the tax wedge induces an immediate rise in labour costs of 0.5 percent, a half of 
which persists after five years.
25 Daveri and Tabellini (1997) argue that the presence of uncoordinated union bargaining 
underlies the correlation between the rise in labour taxes and in unemployment they discover for 
the continental European countries; the absence of such a relationship for the Anglo-Saxon 




























































































macroeconomic exercises. Apart from the empirical difficulty of disentangling a 
truly permanent effect of taxes from phenomena of real wage resistance in 
unionised and less flexible labour markets, an issue still uncovered is that the 
effects of he tax system should vary according to its specific features. For 
instance, the possibility of long run employment effects of tax rises in a unions’ 
bargaining model derives from the different tax treatment of the earnings accruing 
to workers when employed and the pecuniary equivalent of remaining 
unemployed26: for the specific model used by Daveri and Tabellini (1997), the 
relevant aspect is that the unemployment benefits are not taxed and are indexed to 
the gross of taxed wages.
Wage bargaining arrangements
For some time, the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) paper was the basis of a diffused 
consensus on the presence of a simple, hump-shaped relationship between 
centralisation of unions’ bargaining and equilibrium unemployment. The forces at 
work were quite simple: unions’ power can be restrained where a large and 
centralised union movement is self-imposing some discipline (internalising the 
possibly detrimental effects of its own behaviour); alternatively, wage pressure 
can be contained where many single-firm unions are constrained by competition 
forces in product markets27.
That consensus has faded away. Calmfors (1993) has recognised that the 
multiple facets of unions’ bargaining cannot be easily summarised in a simple 
variable like the degree of centralisation. A distinction between the degree of co­
ordination28 and unions’ strength - respectively having a positive and negative 
impact on employment - has been stressed in Layard et al. (1991). Overall, the 
empirical results tend to be mixed: the cross-country estimates presented by 
Scarpetta (1996) and Nickell (1997), seem to confirm a relationship between some 
aspects of unions’ bargaining and unemployment. However, the robustness of the 
econometric evaluations of the hump-shaped relationship has shown to be weak in 
OECD (1997b).
Our reading of this literature is that many of the effects of the bargaining
26 The above reasoning applies to changes in average taxation for a given tax structure 
(progressivity). Changes in tax progressivity for a given average taxation may result in lower 
wage claims by unions or efficiency premia from employers. For a summary discussion of the 
implications of different labour market models for the effects of taxation see Sorensen (1997).
27 The labour demand elasticity is larger at the firm level than at the industry level because of the 
infra-industry competition that the single firm is facing.
28 Co-ordination in the bargaining process, as such depending on the co-ordination existing on 




























































































structure on equilibrium unemployment may depend on the kind of shocks an 
economic system is subject to. The favourable effects of co-ordination (balancing 
the negative impact of unions’ strength) are likely to materialise in the case of 
aggregate shocks in which centralised social partners have the right incentives to 
adjust their behaviour. In such a case, unions’ co-ordination may even substitute 
for other institutions (for instance a stability-oriented and independent central 
bank) in pursuing macroeconomic stability29. By contrast, in the case of micro 
economic shocks and/or where other institutions are already guaranteeing 
macroeconomic stability, unions’ centralisation may have detrimental effects 
insofar as it leads to rigidities impeding the necessary structural adjustment.
Job-security provisions
A shift of the pendulum has also occurred for what concerns the relevance of 
employment regulation, in particular EPL.
While this was identified as one of the most relevant culprits of the “Euro­
sclerosis” in the ‘80s30, a better modelling of labour demand in the presence of 
adjustment costs has shown that direct (i.e. for given wage rates) employment 
impact of firing costs may be even dubious as a sign31. Therefore the role of EPL 
is now considered mostly as indirect, i.e. as a factor leading to persistence (after a 
negative shock has occurred32) or as a factor whose employment relevance comes
29 This interaction between unions’ bargaining structure and central bank independence has been 
recently emphasised by Cukierman and Lippi (1997).
30 See, for instance, Emerson (1988).
31 The hiring costs have an obvious negative impact on both employment variability and its 
average level. The effects of firing costs on the average level of employment are more dubious. 
At the same time they will limit layoffs in some firms and will make some other firms more 
cautious in hiring new staff (which might be terminated in the future). Therefore, a relevant 
parameter is the degree of persistence in the shocks: in Bentolila and Bertola (1990), the presence 
of permanent shocks let firms who are contemplating whether or not to hire new staff (those 
subject to a positive shock) not to worry too much about the risk that in the future the new hired 
staff might be fired at a cost, so that in the aggregate the firing costs may have a positive impact 
on employment. Furthermore, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994) obtain a non-monotonic 
relationship between firing costs and aggregate employment, even in the case of temporary 
shocks (for which the fears of being induced to fire the new staff in the future is more important): 
when the firing costs are already quite high, a further rise of these costs will still have an effect 
on those firms who would like to fire their staff, having on the contrary no further effect on the 
firms which were contemplating whether to hire new staff and which have already refrained from 
doing so. A further consideration derives from the fact that, at least in theory, it is possible that 
the costs impinging on firms because of EPL, which represent a mechanism of insurance for the 
workers, are simply shifted back to workers during the wages’ bargaining process (Lazear, 1991).
32 Diaz and Snower (1996) not have been a problem during the ‘60s when economic cycles were 




























































































from the support it provides to the insiders’ bargaining power.
A further critique to the role of EPL in differentiating across countries in the 
labour market performance has come from the lack, from an empirical point of 
view, of a strong correlation between the countries ranking in EPL strictness and 
job turn-over measures (OECD, 1994, and Contini et al., 1995). Apart from the 
difficulties in the measurement of the jobs and workers turn-over and in 
comparing them across countries, it has to be stressed that a rough uniformity in 
job turnover across countries characterised by different degrees of EPL strictness 
does not imply that the latter does not matter33.
More generally, the possibility that each country has its own model of 
employment adjustment34 does not imply that the formal EPL strictness or any 
other kind of regulation is irrelevant. For instance, job-security provisions might 
lead to an increase in the size of the “informal” sector, hence possibly lowering 
overall productivity and increasing the fiscal burden on the regular and more taxed 
sector (suffering from the displacement deriving from the informal sector). 
Moreover, a strict EPL may hinder product innovation, particularly in the service 
sector, restricting output and employment. This and other developments, in a 
context of increasing interdependence of national economies, may raise in the 
future the potential inefficiencies of strict job-security provisions.35
occurs following a severe recession, as those in the ‘80s and ‘90s. In such case, the retumof 
demand to its pre-shock state may be insufficient to restore employment to its earlier levels.
33 Bertola and Rogerson (1997) argue that broadly similar job-turnover rates in Europe and the 
US may be explained by the combined effect of job-security provisions and relative-wage 
compression.
34 This being provided by self-employment, sub-contracting to small and medium firms, the 
black economy, temporary workers or other solutions able to sidestep the strictness of EPL 
among the standard full-time full-year employees.




























































































3. The internal articulation of the European welfare system(s)
As already pointed out in the previous section, the analysis of the links between 
the welfare system and unemployment has tended either to focus on the impact of 
a single transfer programme, the UB system, or to look at the impact of the overall 
size of the welfare system, via its tax-based financing. We have already discussed 
strengths and weaknesses of these two explanations. This section will show the 
richness of aspects of the welfare system which are actually lost in that kind of 
analysis.
The complexity of the welfare system has been captured in two ways: by 
introducing a different impact of the UB level and duration; and by considering 
the role of the so called “active” measures. It is argued here that other aspects are 
also relevant.
3.1. Unemployment compensation
The standard measure of overall UB generosity (Table 4) is an attempt to 
summarise the two dimensions of benefits: level and the duration. Across 
countries, the overall generosity of unemployment compensation tends to be 
correlated with its generosity over the unemployment spell (Graph 7). In other 
words, where unemployment compensation is relatively generous (in practice most 
continental European countries), there is little attempt to graduate it over time so 
as to attenuate the negative effect of benefit duration. As shown in Graph 8, over 
time, even if in most European countries the overall generosity has shown only a 
slight increase (the UK decline being rather an exception), the duration aspect of 
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Moreover, the UB system does not work in isolation moreover. Other transfer 
programmes may be used (or abused) for financing non-employment. For example, 
invalidity benefits (and early retirement schemes) tend to substitute for 
unemployment compensation, with the effect of formally excluding from the 
labour market workers that would otherwise be counted as unemployed36.
Graph 9 shows that, for a large number of countries (those in the north-west 
and south-east quadrants), there is an inverse relationship between the proportion 
of recipients of unemployment benefits and that of invalidity benefits. It is well 
known that for some countries which have attempted to reform one of the two 
schemes in isolation, massive transfers of recipient across them have occurred37.
Oaph 9. Beneficiaries of irtemploymert compensation (1991), and invalkfty schemes (1990).
(Percentage of 15-64 yeers population)
Unemployment compensation
Source: CECO
36 Comparing countries only on the basis of UB generosity may be misleading. Even if there is
some correlation across countries between the generosity of unemployment compensation and 




























































































3.2. Services versus transfers
The programmes financing non-employment are not the only aspects of the 
structure of welfare on expenditure having potential labour market implications. 
The literature has mostly debated the role of active labour market measures. 
However, whatever their effectiveness, they only cover labour market 
programmes, which are a tiny fraction of the overall welfare system.
Here we widen the perspective by looking at the relationship between cash 
transfers and in-kind services. It is argued that this may be relevant for the 
development of the labour intensive service sector.
The relative weight of services and (cash) transfers provides a fair 
characterisation of the structure of the welfare system. If one compares countries 
along two dimensions -  represented by total social expenditure as percentage of 
GDP and the ratio between benefits and services38 -  relatively distinct patterns 
emerge (Graph 10):
• A Nordic pattern (Sweden, Denmark, and, as a borderline case, Finland) 
characterised by a high level of social expenditure and a relatively high proportion 
of services relative to benefits;
• A continental European pattern, (the Benelux countries, Germany, France and, 
as borderline cases, Italy and Austria), in which social expenditure is also 
relatively high, although distinctly lower than in the Nordic countries, but the 
weight of services relative to benefits is lower;
• A Mediterranean pattern (mainly Spain and Greece, with Italy and Portugal as 
borderline cases at the two extremes), characterised by lower social expenditure 
and a marginal role of services;
• The UK and Ireland, with lower social expenditure than in continental Europe 
and a comparatively higher weight of services relative to benefits;
18 Benefits include old-age cash benefits, survivor’s benefits, unemployment compensation, 
disability cash benefits, occupational injury and disease benefits, sickness benefits, family cash 
benefits, and other contingencies (mainly low-income benefits). Services include family services, 
active labour market programmes and health care. Administration costs (general overheads, 
registration, collection, inspection) are not included, except for active labour market policies and 




























































































• The USA, where social expenditure is much lower than in continental Europe 
and the relative weight of services (essentially, health care) in public expenditure 
much higher.
This two dimensional characterisation bears some correspondence with the 
typologies found in the sociological literature on the welfare state (for example, 
Esping-Andersen, 1990). It is also largely coincident with classifications based on 
the description of institutions (European Commission, 1995). Furthermore, the 
services/benefit dimension tends to overlap with the aged/non-aged dimension, 
measuring the ratio between old-age and survivor benefits, on the one hand, and 
other social expenditures (excluding health), on the other hand (OECD, 1996b). 
This is because everywhere old-age pension expenditure is the largest item in cash 
benefits.
The level of social expenditure per se does not seem to affect the 
employment performance, as measured by the employment rate. In fact, Nordic 
countries and the USA -  which are at the opposite side of the spectrum in terms of 
size of social expenditure - score the highest, with the continental European 
pattern and the Mediterranean pattern doing less well (Graph 11). The 
employment in services -  particularly the community, social and personal 
services39 - is behind the high levels of employment in both the Nordic countries 
and the USA.
The positive correlation between the relative share of expenditure in in-kind 
services (Graph 12) suggests that an orientation of social expenditure towards 
services may offset any potential negative effects of a large welfare state on 
employment.
39 Community social and personal services include sanitary services, educational services, 
medical and other health services, recreational and cultural services, personal and household 




























































































Graph 11. Social expenditu re and to ta l em ploym ent. 
(1993)
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Clearly, cross-country comparison along two dimensions, as those presented 
above, can at best offer a very partial representation of the complex relationship 
between welfare state systems and employment systems. It is tempting 
nevertheless to highlight a number of points:
• Levels and structures of welfare state provision differ profoundly across 
Europe. In terms of expenditure levels, for example, about one third of EU 
member countries are definitely closer to the USA than to the Nordic countries. 
Perhaps more importantly, in terms of structures, differences in the weight of 
services relative to benefits suggest significantly different approaches to the means 
and the objectives of the welfare state.
• In terms of employment performance, the American model and the Nordic 
model stand out as two alternative routes to high employment. Interestingly, both 
result in a high reliance on social and personal services as providers of jobs. The 
key distinction between the two employment systems lies in the role of the public 
sector as employer, which is relatively dominant in the Nordic model and residual 
in the American model. This in turn is reflected in the extreme differences in level 
of taxation and the structure of industrial relations40. Each model has its own 
problems. The perceived downside of the American model, especially from a 
European perspective, is the high degree of earnings inequality and the associated 
results in terms of social exclusion41. This in turns raises questions about the 
“social sustainability” of the model and its applicability in different socio-cultural 
environments. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the problems of the Nordic 
model may derive from the pervasiveness of the State role and the associated tax 
burden. Besides the results in terms of employment/unemployment outcomes42, 
there are indications that the very large weight of the public sector in the Nordic 
model results in important static and dynamic inefficiencies, with negative effects 
on the long-run economic performance (Lindbeck, 1997).
• A number of European countries seem to present a combination of relatively 
high levels of taxation and relatively low levels of employment. There has not
40 For a comparisons between the American model and the Swedish model stressing the 
importance of sheltered services and the respective roles of the private and the public sector see 
also Appelbaum and Schettkat (1993) and Scharpf (1997).
41 Cross-country evidence supports the existence of a systematic relationship between 
institutional features frequently quoted as contributing to the superior employment performance 
of the US labour market, particularly the low degree of collective bargaining coverage and the 
low rate of union membership, and the spread of earnings inequality (Freeman, 1996b).
42 The recent surge of unemployment in Sweden has been taken by a number of observers as 
evidence of the long-term unsustainability of the employment performance of the Nordic model, 




























































































been substitution between public and private demand for services in the labour 
market. Public spending has been primarily geared towards income maintenance 
and the labour market has played a lesser role in income distribution.
These features of mainly continental countries may be a cause for concern in 
the medium/long-term, especially if one takes into account concomitant trends in 
industrial activity and in demography.
In industrial terms, since the 1980s, services have been the only sector with a 
positive net employment creation in both the USA and in Europe: low levels of 
employment in services may suggest that institutions are relatively ill adapted to 
the ongoing shift from the “industrial” to the “tertiary” economy.
In demographic terms, it is arguably not a coincidence that countries with a 
welfare system geared toward benefits relative to services and, correspondingly, 
toward the aged relatively to the non-aged (e.g., Germany, Italy and Spain vis-à- 
vis the Nordic countries), tend to be characterised by particularly low fertility rates 
and hence, in perspective, particularly pronounced ageing. This risks feeding a 
vicious circle in which the increasing weight of the elderly further tilts the balance 
of social expenditure toward pensions, thereby exacerbating the disincentive 
effects of the welfare state on employment.
4. Interactions between labour market institutions
As stressed earlier, labour market institutions are intertwined in various and 
complex manners across European countries and result in distinct national 
employment systems. The present section argues that relations of complementarity 
or substitutability between these various mechanisms and institutions - often 
inspired by similar principles -  may result in “double” safety nets and excessive 
rigidity in the face of adjustment to a changing economic environment.
4.1. Social partners behaviour, wage bargaining system and EPL
Bargaining systems, employment regulations, welfare provisions contribute to 
shape the behaviour of social partners and are themselves affected by such 
behaviour.
Inspection of Table 4 suggests a number of observations on the relationship 
between co-ordination, which is generally considered good for employment, and 




























































































Both union density and bargaining coverage are usually considered as measures of 
union strength. A positive, albeit weak, correlation exists between union density 
and co-ordination, although the index of co-ordination is very rough (only three 
values are considered and most of the countries are being assigned a unique 
intermediate value). A positive correlation also appears to hold between 
bargaining coverage and co-ordination.
The interplay between coverage and density is complex. In certain countries 
the former seems to reflect mainly the ability (or lack thereof) of the unions to 
represent workers’ interests (mainly the Nordic countries and, on the opposite side 
of the spectrum, the UK and US). In some countries, administrative rules appear to 
have supplemented, if not replaced altogether (typically in France), union 
representativeness in safeguarding their role in wage negotiations.43
As a first approximation, the difference between coverage and density can be 
interpreted as an indicator of “artificial” union strength, i.e. a strength not deriving 
from the unions ability to gain the workers’ support. This index, hereafter dubbed 
“excess bargaining coverage”, is supposed to neutralise the possible positive 
effects of unions’ strength (strong unions may more likely feel entrusted with 
representing the national interest and hence be more willing to co-ordinate).
As shown in Graph 13, the excess coverage is negatively correlated with the 
employment rate in our sample of countries.44
43 However, as pointed out by OECD (1997b, p. 84), a high coverage “insurance” may contribute 
to a decrease in unionisation as workers feel less motivated to join the unions to benefit from 
collective agreements (this may be the case in Austria).




























































































Graph 13. Excess bargaining coverage and employment rate, <«». in o i and mo.).






























































































Two sets of countries have distinctively low excess bargaining coverage and a 
high employment rate: the highly decentralised and uncoordinated Anglo-Saxon 
economies, with very weak unions, which, in principle, benefit from the allocation 
efficiency provided by such systems; and, on the opposite side of the spectrum, the 
Nordic countries with strong unions and highly co-ordinated and centralised 
bargaining systems, able to internalise wage spill-overs. On the contrary, 
continental and Mediterranean countries are characterised by a much higher 
excess coverage and, by and large, a lower employment rate. Although only 
suggestive, this evidence points to the perverse effect on employment of 
artificially-blown trade union strength.
Are there labour market institutions that favour the emergence of an excess 
bargaining coverage, thereby contributing to the poor employment performance?
Empirically, it appears that the degree of strictness of job security provisions, 
rather than the generosity of the welfare system, is associated with excess 
coverage. As shown in Graph 14, a positive correlation exists between EPL 
rigidity and the excess coverage indicator. In particular, the correlation is strong 
between the two groups of countries situated at the ends of the excess coverage 
ranking (Anglo-Saxon plus Nordic, on the one hand, and continental plus 
Mediterranean, on the other hand), while France and the Netherlands are clear 
outliers. Therefore, there is a strong presumption that legally-supported union 
strength tends to emerge mainly in those countries characterised by interventionist 
labour market regulations.
4.2. Job-security provisions and benefit generosity
As is well known, some form of EPL can be rationalised as a substitute for 
insurance that markets cannot provide45. To the extent that labour market 
regulations and welfare provisions respond to similar types of market failure, they 
are functional equivalents and can be seen as institutional substitutes: “Labour 
market policy regimes work like communicating pipelines. If one policy is 
underdeveloped, others will very likely replace or offset it” (Schmid, 1995, p. 57).
The ranking indicator of EPL strictness is represented in Graph 15 against the 
summary measure of benefit entitlements (UB) for the 1990s, already used in 
previous sections. Unlike previous graphs, all OECD countries are pictured.




























































































Graph 15. EPL ranking (»v. 1 ass-93) and UB summary measure of generosity (av. 1990s).
EPL
'Adapted by N  author* 
Sourc. OECO
Countries present widely different combinations of labour market regulations and 
income support for the unemployed. As shown in the graph, the various 
combinations of EPL strictness and benefit generosity can be described in terms of 
“pseudo-indifference curves” in the “workers protection” space: a given degree of 
workers protection can be obtained by different combinations of job security 
provisions and compensation in the event of unemployment46. Another message 
emerging from the graph is that, whatever the combination of instruments, EU 
Member States (with the exception of the UK) and Norway choose a much higher 
degree of protection than the other OECD countries, as shown by the outward 
position of EU countries’ pseudo-indifference curve. As expected, the weakest 
protection is attained in the USA where low levels of both EPL and UB co-exist.
Within the EU, liberal labour market regulations coupled with generous 
unemployment compensation are found in Denmark, Netherlands and, to an 
extent, Finland. On the opposite side of the spectrum, in Italy and Greece, the 
underdevelopment of the benefit system has been compensated by high job 
security provisions. EU continental countries have typically an intermediate 
position.
46 Describing institutional equilibrium in the labour market in terms of attaining a certain degree 
of job security through various combination of EPL and UB is done simply for illustrative 
purposes. As the indicator of EPL strictness is a ranking, the curves in the graph cannot be 
interpreted literally as indifference curves. Furthermore, we are fully aware that different 





























































































While functionally equivalent in the “workers protection” space, different 
combinations of job security provisions and unemployment benefits are not neutral 
with respect to economic and employment performance. We have already seen that 
interventionist regulations appear to be correlated with the excess bargaining 
coverage. Furthermore, the rigid EPL -  low UB combination may be highly 
inefficient in the event of sectoral, technological and organisational shocks 
entailing changes in comparative advantages and requiring swift labour re­
allocation between firms and sectors. The relative importance of such kind of 
shocks may be increased by the process of globalisation, as well as the increasing 
interdependence arising from EMU and the deepening of the Single Market.
5. Mutually supporting rigidities in product and labour markets
The regulation of product and labour markets provides an example of the linkages 
that exist between institutional sets within each national system, of which the 
employment system is itself a part.
As Graph 16 shows, a fair degree of correlation seems to exist between the 
relative rigidity of product and labour market regimes47: countries that rank high 
in labour market regulations, such as Italy and Greece, tend to have the highest 
degree of product market regulation; the Anglo-Saxon countries have the lightest 
regulation both in product and labour markets; the other European countries tend 
to fall in between on both dimensions. This in turn suggests a relationship of 
complementarity between the two institutional sets: as product and labour market 
regulations reinforce each other, lack of competition in the product markets 
compounds the labour market problems created by employment rigidities, with the 
effect of one being difficult to disentangle from that of the other.
47 The classification of product and labour market regimes inevitably contains judgmental 
elements. The data used in our example are drawn from Koedijk and Kremers (1996). The 
regression line in Graph 16, however, excludes the data for Spain and Portugal, whose 




























































































Graph 16. Degree of product and labour marlcet regulation in European countries.
“Defensive” industrial policies can also be interpreted within our institutional 
framework. By defensive industrial policies we mean various forms of support 
granted by governments to industry, particularly in connection with situations of 
crisis. State aid to industry can be taken as a proxy for the extent of such policies, 
which can be seen as part of a wider pattern of product market regulation: data 
indicate that countries where state aid to industry is the highest tend to have 
heavily regulated product markets48.
Leonard and Van Audenrode (1993) provide an interpretation of the genesis 
of industrial policies and their effects on the labour market that stresses the risks 
of degeneration of the corporatist model prevailing to different degrees in 
(continental) European countries. In a corporatist setting, the government is 
supposed to engage in political exchange with the trade unions and the employers’ 
organisations on a broad set of policies, with the objective of lowering aggregate 
wages and thereby increasing employment. Insofar as these defensive policies are 
endogenous, the rise in unemployment could itself have created a vicious circle by 
heading to further pressure for state aids.
48 According to the Fifth Survey on State Aid (European Commission, 1997a), based on the data 
for the 1992-94 period, the highest intensity of state aid to industry (state aid as percentage of 




























































































The bias in favour of established organisations implicit in such arrangements, 
however, can result in policies that discourage firms’ and jobs’ turnover with 
ultimately negative effects on output and employment. In general, taxing the rest 
of the economy to subsidise some sectors will reduce labour demand at any given 
wage rate, if the elasticity of output supply is lower in the subsidised sector and 
the capital intensity is higher.
Some empirical evidence corroborates this line of reasoning. Industrial policies 
tend to privilege large enterprises in established sectors, presumably on the ground 
of better access to the decision-making process. Small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which are relatively penalised, are more labour intensive than large 
enterprises (European Network for SME Research, 1997). The existence a 
negative relationship between the intensity of state aids and the employment rate 
across EU countries also lends some support to the employment-reducing effect of 
industrial policies.
The complementarity between labour and product market arrangements has 
also implications for the employment outcomes of possible reforms. If product 
markets regulations are a significant source of rents and underemployment, a 
movement towards decentralised bargaining in the labour market that is not 
accompanied by an adequate product market liberalisation may actually exacerbate 
the problem. If wage setting is decentralised, the single firms’ unions may be less 
restrained from seeking to exploit rents in the product market to the benefit of 
their members, possibly to the detriment of employment in the rest of the 
economy.
6. Lack of institutional variety within national employment systems
The approaching of EMU has spurred some interest on the regional dimension of 
unemployment in Europe. The issue usually examined has been that of the labour 
market reaction to an idiosyncratic shock, the ultimate aim being that of rating 
EMU according to the theoretical criteria of an “optimal currency area”.
The common wisdom is that the unemployment effects of a demand shock are 
not more persistent in Europe than in the US; however the adjustment mechanism 
is drastically different in the two cases, with a change in the participation rate, and 
therefore in the employment level, in Europe and the workers’ migrations in the 
US49. Concerning EMU, these are somehow mixed news: the lack of labour
49 On the two different sets of results see Blanchard and Katz (1992), for the US case, and Fatas 




























































































mobility is, per se, a minus in the assessment of the “optimality” of EMU as a 
currency area50; however, this lack of mobility is a feature characterising also each 
individual country, having no direct implication for the EMU related irrevocability 
of the between countries exchange rates51.
While in this literature the relevant issue is that of the dynamic reaction to 
idiosyncratic shocks, the point which will be mostly here developed is that the 
amount of regional (infra-national) variation in unemployment is, in some cases, 
so large to put into question the same reference to the country as the relevant unit 
of analysis. Not only national rates of unemployment average out significant 
regional differences, but the distribution of unemployment in some countries tends 
to be significantly asymmetric, with national (average) rates of unemployment 
inflated by few high-unemployment regions.
One might say that the high average unemployment of these countries is not 
representative of the prevailing labour market situation. Taking the median region 
as representative of the typical labour market institutions of a given country, the 
“excess” of the average unemployment (inflated by those few high unemployment 
regions) with respect to the median value of unemployment52 provides a measure 
of the “excess unemployment” due to the presence of regional outliers (Graph 17). 
For some countries (Italy, Belgium) the difference amounts to as much as two 
percentage points of the labour force53.
50 The point often neglected in the debate considering EMU as a “currency area”, to be judged 
according to a well defined set of criteria, is that EMU is also an institutional reform of the 
economic policy making, strengthening the stability orientation of macro policy and implying a 
reduction in the policy related idiosyncratic shocks at the national level. For a survey of the 
several aspects implied by EMU, see European Commission (1998).
51 For instance, see Gros and Hefeker (1997).
52 Median unemployment is defined as the unemployment rate of the median region, obtained by 
ranking the regions in each country by increasing rate of unemployment and selecting the region 
containing the 50th percentile of the labour force. Regions are defined according the most 
detailed level (NUTS3 level) in the classification of the European Communities.
53 Our definition of “excess” unemployment simply relates to the asymmetries in the across 
regions unemployment distribution, aiming at pinpointing the presence of few high 
unemployment regions. Other definitions might be constructed starting from the dispersion (as 
measured by across regions standard deviation) of unemployment, relating the excess of 
unemployment to the non-linearities in the wage-unemployment relationship which lead to a 




























































































Graph 17. Median versus national unemployment
( 1996)
Graph 18. "Excess unemployment", 1996, and relative average regional GDP deviation 
(national average=100), 1994.






























































































Persistent regional differentials in the distribution of unemployment have to be 
related to those institutional characteristics, such as those of the housing market, 
which discourage inter-regional mobility, along the lines of the literature 
previously discussed.
The asymmetries54 emphasised here can be taken as an indication of a 
mismatch between institutions, mostly shaped at the national level and very often 
unduly homogeneous inside a given country, and the economic environment 
prevailing in some of its regions. Specifically, pressures for wage equalisation 
within the same country may arise, because of several institutional factors, 
irrespective of productivity differentials, resulting in a wage gap in the low- 
income regions. Besides the pressures coming from trade unions (particularly 
where bargaining is made at the national level), other institutional factors will be 
at work in the same direction, including the availability of income maintenance 
programmes geared toward the national average and, more in general, the very 
existence of a (large) public sector, where conditions tend to be the same across 
the country55.
Excess unemployment arises when a country is strongly differentiated on 
regional lines (as distinct, for example, from differentiation on industrial lines) 
and its political and social institutions are uniformly shaped from the centre. The 
presence of both conditions (regional income inequality being a proxy of one of 
them) is necessary for excess unemployment to arise.
An empirical inspection lends some support to the hypothesis that countries 
with larger internal differentiations in the economic situation tend to have a worse 
unemployment performance at the national level. Specifically, countries with a 
high degree of regional income inequality seem to have higher “excess” 
unemployment (Graph 18).
In a sense, the institutional mismatch hypothesis boils down to some standard 
explanations of European unemployment, in terms of wage rigidities and the 
disincentive effects of the welfare state: in the absence of pressures for wage 
equalisation and income support from the richer to the poorer regions excess 
unemployment in the less developed and depressed regions would not follow from 
their lower income level. At the same time it differs from those standard
54 Unfortunately we do not have data long enough for testing the persistence over time of these 
asymmetries, so as to rule out the possibility that they simply derive from asymmetries in the 
current shocks. Our feeling is that the picture which would emerge from a longer run view of the 
across regions distribution of unemployment is not much different from that shown in the 
previous chart.




























































































explanations, at least in their usual formulations, as it highlights the fact that the 
same institutional arrangements may be neutral or even supportive towards 
employment in a given environment and detrimental to it when they are applied in 
different conditions.
7. Conclusions and policy considerations
This paper claims that the way institutions interact is important both to understand 
the structural nature of Europe’s unemployment and to devise the appropriate 
policy responses.
Our conclusions can be summarised as follows:
1. As national employment systems tend to be closely interlocked, comprehensive 
action, rather than scattered measures seems to be the key for success in tackling 
unemployment. The reforms should span both labour and product markets, as 
rigidities in the two fields are often related.
2. The internal structure of the welfare system may be relevant for the 
employment outcome. An important aspect which may explain why both US and 
Nordic models, while not without problems of their own, produce high 
employment, is that both are conducive to the development of the social services 
sector.
3. Different labour market institutions often pursue similar objectives (typically 
protection of workers) and, as such, are “institutional equivalents”. Relations of 
substitutability exist between job protection legislation and unemployment 
compensation, or, within the welfare system, between unemployment and 
invalidity benefits. However, institutional equivalence does not imply economic 
equivalence, in terms of employment performance and ability to respond to 
shocks. Specifically, the high EPL-low UB combination is likely to become 
increasingly inefficient.
4. In a number of continental countries there exists a combination of relatively 
weak trade unions, typically unable to shoulder the national interest and to co­
ordinate their action, and high bargaining coverage, through administrative 
extension to the bulk of the workforce of collective agreements. This “excess 




























































































5. The importance of the regional component of unemployment in several EU 
countries points to a lack of “institutional variety” within EU countries. When a 
uniform institutional set-up is super-imposed onto a heterogeneous situation, in 
terms of productivity levels and, more generally, economic development, an 
institutional mismatch emerges, with negative consequences for employment.
How can the ongoing reform process in EU countries be judged in the light of 
these conclusions?
The imperative of implementing wide-ranging structural reforms involving a 
better functioning of labour markets and completing the Single Market has been at 
the heart of the EU employment strategy since the 1993 White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment (see BOX).56 57
The EU strategy has been built on the idea that wide-ranging reform does not 
imply fully embracing the US model. This paper seems to confirm the possibility 
of preserving European peculiarities. For instance, the analysis of the 
substitutability of unemployment compensation and job-security legislation points 
to a possible “third way” between the full flexibility of the Anglo-Saxon model 
and the rigidity of many continental countries. The “low EPL-high UB” 
institutional mix of countries like Denmark or the Netherlands has the potential 
advantage of allowing structural change and labour re-allocation while 
maintaining an adequate degree of solidarity. On the contrary, a number of 
developments requiring higher flexibility (including EMU and the deepening of 
the Single Market) point to an increasing sub-optimality of rigid EPL as a means 
to achieve workers protection37.
Accepting a suitable income replacement for the unemployed does not imply that 
further reforms of the current benefit systems in Europe are not warranted, for 
example, concerning the time profile of benefits and their administration58. In this 
context, a stronger effort in Active Labour Market Policies, as recommended by 
the Luxembourg Employment Guidelines, and mobility-enhancing measures (such 
as housing policies) may also have an important role in shifting from workers’
56 A comprehensive approach is considered a pre-requisite for success by the OECD (see OECD, 
1997c). Coe and Snower (1997) stress the policy complementarities of wide-ranging measures. 
While a broad-based action is required, one should be aware that, even radical reforms, as the 
example of the UK shows, would take time to produce results.
57 This conclusion seems to be consistent with the proposal by Rhodes (1997) to reform the 
continental model towards a sort of “competitive corporatism”.
58 Other more radical reforms -  such as the use of personal insurance accounts, negative income 
tax or employment vouchers -  may also be envisaged. See, e.g. Snower (1995 and 1996), Snower 




























































































support “on the job” (via rigid EPL) to support “on the market” (via adequate UB, 
training, etc.).
The EU efforts in labour market reforms have relied on the subsidiarity 
principle. This has been considered a weakness, in that no strong push to reform 
has been exercised on individual countries.
Our discussion shows that preserving institutional variety, far from being a 
constraint, may be a point of strength. It confirms that each country needs a 
specific package of reforms. Moreover, the importance of the regional (i.e. infra­
national) dimension in European unemployment and its explanation in terms of 
institutional mismatch carry relevant implications concerning the conditions for 
success of monetary unification in Europe. Given the greater differentiation that 
exists across regions Europe-wide than within any individual country, pressures 
toward greater uniformity of labour market institutions or wage equalisation 
following EMU would carry the risk of increasing institutional mismatch and 
hence jeopardise the efficiency gains expected from the adoption of a single 
currency.
While the broad principles of the EU reform process appears to be soundly 
based, its actual implementation, so far, has remained patchy.
As the Joint Employment Report to the Luxembourg Jobs Summit puts it,
“(d)espite important structural reforms carried out in some Member States, the overall 
picture that emerges is somewhat obscure, given the insufficient integration between policy 
measures and the absence in many cases of any clear long-term strategy, or well defined 
policy goals. (...) In some cases, the reforms and policies have been too timid considering 
the scale of the problem or too patchy without a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach. 
(...) There remains the need to tackle the key problems in the functioning of the labour 
market and to gather support for bold reform projects.” (JER, 1997, p. 8).
Implementing successfully the reforms raises a number of issues. The “time 
consistency” of reforms appears to be an important ingredient. Although not all 
the measures can, realistically, be implemented at once, it is paramount that each 
subsequent move creates a constituency in favour of further moves59. This aspect 
may be important in reducing the costs of transition linked to the risk of 
reversibility of liberalisation (Bertola and Ichino, 1995). More competition in 
product markets, through the Single Market programme and the related Action 
Plan, as well as the fading of traditional forms of bail out in EMU (monetary bail
59 This aspect may be important in reducing the costs of transition linked to the risk of 




























































































out, government hand outs, “defensive” industrial policies), can be expected to 
feed back eventually to higher wage and labour market flexibility60. However, in 
order to bring about a virtuous cycle, it is important that bold labour market 
reforms tackling the specific bottlenecks in the national employment system are 
quickly implemented61.
Achieving the necessary social consensus to ensure the success of reforms may be 
comparatively less difficult both in highly co-ordinated and in decentralised 
systems (though the reform paths would be completely different in the two groups 
of countries) whilst it may prove more complicated in poorly co-ordinated, 
“intermediate” Member States.62
13.2.98
60 See, European Commission (1997b).
61 The success of Denmark in tackling youth’s welfare dependency and, on the negative side, the 
failure of the labour market reforms in Spain in the 1980s, which, by deregulating “at the 
margin”, consolidated de facto the power of insiders (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994) are clear 
examples. The recent agreement between the social partners in Spain which is significantly 
easing job-security provisions for permanent workers can be expected to have a much more 
favourable impact. An example of successful sequencing of reforms may come from New 
Zealand (see Evans et al., 1997).
62 Similarly, “vertical”, sectoral-based welfare systems (usually providing transfers to cohese and 
vocal social categories) may prove more difficult to reform than “horizontal”, though on the 
whole more generous, welfare systems. The former are typical of continental countries, while the 






















































































































































































THE EU EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY FROM THE 1993 WHITE PAPER TO 
THE 1998 LUXEMBOURG GUIDELINES
The 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (European 
Commission, 1993) indicated a list of priorities for action on jobs in the labour 
market area, covering both “lenient” and “harsh” measures (amongst the former, 
lifelong education and training, reduction in the relative cost of low-qualified 
work, exploiting new sources of jobs; amongst the latter, greater flexibility in 
businesses, both internally and externally). These were complemented by 
measures aiming at promoting economic growth, such as the promotion of Trans- 
European Networks in telecommunications, transport and energy.
The European Council in Essen in December 1994 formalised the involvement of 
the Union: it selected five guidelines which were, in fact, a mix of final and policy 
targets and agreed upon a burden sharing between EU and national responsibilities 
(Member States would present Multi-Annual Employment Programmes; through 
Joint Reports, the Commission and the Council would monitor national efforts so 
as to enhance peer pressure).
The Essen approach paved the way to the new Employment Title in the Amsterdam 
Treaty which confirmed that the main focus on employment is to remain at the 
national level. The Essen monitoring process was formally supplemented by 
Employment Guidelines drawn up at the EU level, similarly to the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines of art. 103.
The Luxembourg Jobs Summit in November 1997 provided the ground for a first, 
ex ante application of the new Treaty. The Guidelines adopted by the Summit 
restated strongly MS own responsibility for employment, confirmed the need for a 
global strategy embracing growth, competitiveness and employment and indicated 
some quantified objectives in the area of ALMPs reflecting best practices.
The Guidelines were articulated in four themes (employability, entrepreneurship, 
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